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Shin Dong-hyuk considered himself lucky when a prison guard chopped off the tip
of his finger. Born and raised an inmate of a North Korean prison camp, Shin had not
expected to receive a punishment other than execution for breaking a sewing machine,
albeit by accident.1 Later, Shin got even luckier. In 2005, he was able to successfully
escape the prison camp, becoming the only known North Korean defector who was born
in prison.
Most would hope to believe that “gulags,” the mass incarceration systems used by
Socialist countries to suppress anti-state political factions, are a thing of the past.
However, unbeknownst to many, their dark legacy lives on in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (“DPRK” or “North Korea”) in the form of kwan-li-so, an extensive
system of state-authorized concentration camps.
It is estimated that nearly 200,000 people are being held in kwan-li-so and related
systems, often without due process and in brutal conditions, in flagrant violation of
international human rights conventions.2 Over 400,000 prisoners have died in these
camps over the past thirty years, from causes including starvation, death by labor, torture,
executions, and more.3
This issue is particularly noteworthy today, as political tensions mount in the
Korean peninsula and beyond. As recently as January 2014, North Korean leader Kim
Jong-Un repeatedly declared a state of war with South Korea and threatened to attack the
U.S. with atomic weapons.4 North Korea remains one of the most militarily menacing
nations in the world, and therefore is subject to vast media coverage about its military
schemes, weapon development, and war threats. Meanwhile, however, little attention has
been paid to its serious domestic issues, including its failure to comply with international
human rights standards.
In particular, the dearth of scholarship addressing North Korean prison camps is
disproportionate to the gravity of the issue. Such notable silence may be a result of
1 Choe Sang-Hun, North Korean Defectors Tell U.N. Panel of Prison Camp Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/21/world/asia/north-korean-defectors-tell-un-panel-of-prisoncamp-abuses.html.
2 James S. Robbins, Got Gulag? North Korea Does, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (June 9, 2005, 7:45 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/214647/got-gulag/james-s-robbins.
3 DLA P IPER & U.S. COMM. FOR HUM. RTS. IN NORTH KOREA, FAILURE TO PROTECT: A CALL FOR THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACT IN NORTH KOREA 30, 34 (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.cfr.org/un/failure-protectcall-un-security-council-act-north-korea/p11903 [hereinafter DLA PIPER].
4 Jack Kim, North Korea Threats: Pyongyang Steps up Rhetoric Against U.S. Bases in Japan and Guam,
THE HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/21/north-koreathreats_n_2920984.html; Sam Kim, North Korea Reportedly Entering 'State Of War' Against South Korea,
THE HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/29/north-korea-state-ofwar_n_2982025.html.
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general diplomatic and political sensitivities towards North Korea and fear of military
retaliation. Moreover, an aggravating factor is the Kim regime’s notorious policy of
secrecy.
¶6
This note is based on the notion that raising awareness is the first step towards
redress and setting the record straight about what is and is not acceptable in the eyes of
the international community. While these “soft measures” may seem modest in light of
the imminent need to stall the mass detainment, suffering, and deaths in North Korea,
they are also precisely what are necessary to serve as a catalyst for further action.
¶7
Applying political pressure on the North Korean government through extensive and
proactive media campaign implemented by the most powerful United Nations branches is
an unprecedented approach. Being a novel agenda, it does carry some risks, such as the
possibility of eliciting no response from North Korea, or, worse yet, provoking a negative
response whereby tensions will heighten. However, the aspiration is that a long-term
change in awareness and attitude towards the preservation and dignity of human life will
nudge North Korea in the right direction. As the international community increasingly
participates in discussions about the North Korean prison systems, it will apply pressure
on North Korea to increase transparency in its criminal prosecutions and detainment as
well as compliance with the customary international laws governing the protection of
human rights.
¶8
It is important that the media coverage of North Korean prisoners arouse sympathy
among the audience. This is because any media campaign must inspire action and
mobilize a movement toward meaningful change in order to be effective. However, what
is more important is that the coverage be a respectable, objective, and factually accurate
narrative, rather than one that merely sensationalizes the issue.
¶9
The media campaign must have the long-term goal of establishing a universal norm
for how humans treat each other. Doing so will lend legitimacy to future tribunals that
may try those accountable for crimes against humanity in North Korea. More
importantly, however, these conciliatory and diplomatic efforts will pave the road
towards demilitarization of North Korea as well as a peaceful reunification of the two
Koreas.
¶10
This note proposes to close the information gap regarding North Korean prison
camps by calling upon the United Nations, the most prominent international organ, to
initiate, monitor, and sustain aggressive global media coverage of kwan-li-so. The scope
of this note does not cover criminal prosecution of North Korean officials responsible for
the existence and operation of kwan-li-so. Contemplation of various forums for redress
for the North Korean victims has been covered in depth elsewhere.5 Rather, the goal of
this note is to propose a more subdued and long-term, yet equally crucial process of
transforming political attitudes and priorities of the international community surrounding
the issue of North Korean prison camps.
¶11
In pursuing this particular form of humanitarian intervention, there are several
practical considerations, not least of which is the limitation of resources, including
funding and staffing. There is also the on-going issue of sustainability, consistency, and
objectivity in application on an international scale. Given these challenges, this note
proposes and evaluates two potential entities to spearhead the coordination and

5

See Morse H. Tan, Finding A Forum for North Korea, 65 SMU L. Rev. 765 (2012).
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monitoring of the concerted worldwide media campaign: the United Nations Working
Group on Arbitrary Detainment and the United Nations Security Council.
¶12
The note will begin by presenting the state of North Korean political prisons and
the North Korean government’s detainment policy as they are known today. Next, the
note will provide an overview of the international response thus far, mainly through the
mechanisms of the United Nations former Commission on Human Rights, the Special
Rapporteur for Human Rights in North Korea, the United Nations General Assembly,
and, most recently, the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. The note will also outline the legal framework that governs
the gross human rights violations that exist in the North Korean prison camps. References
will be made to specific provisions of two of the most relevant international human rights
laws, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Rome Statute.
I. WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT KWAN-LI-SO TODAY
¶13

Kwan-li-so are prison-labor camps that house political prisoners on a large scale
and impose forced labor upon thousands of North Koreans. They are arbitrary and extrajudicial facilities that incarcerate not only the accused, but up to three generations of the
accused’s family.6 Moreover, the prisoners are kept at starvation-level and forced to
engage in severe physical labor.
¶14
The 2004 report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of
Representatives states, “the terrible human rights situation inside North Korea . . . has
remained largely hidden from the outside world until the past several years.”7 For
example, the topic of the prison camp system is not even mentioned in North Korea’s
country report issued by the Amnesty International in 2005.8 To this day, there is not
much known about kwan-li-so, and even the scant information available is based on
anecdotes of escapees, which are practically unverifiable. This omission and information
vacuum form a vicious cycle, whereby silence reinforces apathy towards the issue. Lack
of interest, in turn, leads to lack of media coverage and discussion. This has been a
substantial challenge for the international human rights organizations and governments.
¶15
Of the scant sources available, the most reliable are reports by North Korean
defectors. In the mid-1990s, a severe nationwide famine forced an unprecedented number
of North Koreans to attempt to flee the country. One positive outcome of this tragic
circumstance is that those who successfully defected were able to relay information to the
outside world about the North Korean government’s human rights abuses and the prison
camp system.9
¶16
Today, with the help of North Korean defectors’ testimony, it is understood that
there are six kwan-li-so in existence.10 It is estimated that each camp contains from 5,000
to as many as 50,000 people.11 The North Korean prison camps originated in 1947, the

DLA PIPER, supra note 3, at 34.
H.R. REP. 109-478 (2004), at 11.
8 Robbins, supra note 2.
9 DLA P IPER, supra note 3, at 34.
10 Id.
11 Id.

6
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first prisoners being landowners, religious persons, and those who supported Japan in its
occupation of Korea.
From the beginning, the North Korean government used prison camps as a means
of ideological control and oppression. The North Korean State Security Department is the
official agency in charge of investigating and punishing real and alleged political offenses
within North Korea.12 The agency has full authority to employ secret police to locate
those who slander the regime and punish offenders, including by imprisonment.13
In the 1950s through the late 1960s, Kim Il-Sung’s regime targeted political
opponents, who were declared “dangerously deluded in their political beliefs” and
separated from the rest of the population through imprisonment.14 The crimes that
warranted a prison term were both real and imagined. Some were incarcerated for minor
disturbances such as expressing exasperation with the difficulty of life generally, or
minor acts of defiance like singing a South Korean song.
When Kim Jong-Il succeeded his father as the country’s leader in 1994, he
expanded the political prison camps to accommodate opponents to his new regime. By
1982, the North Korean government had sentenced over 100,000 political opponents.15 In
the late 1980s, the government feared that reform in Eastern Europe and the collapse of
communism threatened North Korea’s political system. As a consequence, it further
utilized the political prison camps to quash dissidents.
The parallel between North Korea and other communist states is undeniable. Kwanli-so has often been compared to Stalinist gulags, and North Korea described as a “bona
fide Soviet state.”16 North Korean kwan-li-so resembles Soviet gulags in their size, scope,
and purpose of political suppression. In some aspects, the North Korean system is even
more coercive than the Soviet counterpart, as it ignores due process and pro forma
trials.17 In North Korea, suspects are not given any notice or opportunity to defend their
innocence. State officials simply abduct them without informing them of the offense and
use interrogation and torture to force “confession” to the crime. Suspects are incarcerated
without due process of trial, or being given any information as to when, if ever, they may
be released.
The North Korean State Security Department will incarcerate up to three
generations of the accused’s family, including mother, father, sisters, brothers, children,
and grandchildren.18 This practice is rooted in Kim Il-Song’s theory that the “seeds” of
the accused must be eliminated through three generations.19 Families are often arrested
for a family member’s “crime of high treason” without being given the specific
allegations.
Moreover, the prisoners are provided starvation-level food rations, despite being
forced to engage in demanding physical labor.20 As a result, prisoners’ physical

Id. at 30.
Id.
14 DLA P IPER, supra note 3, at 33.
15 Id.
16 Robbins, supra note 2.
17 Id.
18 DLA P IPER, supra note 3, at 34.
19 Id. at 34-35.
20 Id. at 35-36.
12

13
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conditions deteriorate from over-exertion and under-nourishment.21 Death and disease
such as diarrhea are common due to malnutrition.22 Keeping the prisoners in such
conditions serves the purpose of diminishing their morale, thereby turning these prisoners
into more manageable subjects from the perspective of the North Korean government.23
Food ration depends on the prisoner’s completion of work assignments, which results in a
vicious cycle of food deprivation leading to the exhaustion, and inability to complete
work leading to further deprivation of food.24
Nearly twenty to twenty-five percent of the North Korean prisoners are worked to
death each year.25 This figure does not include those who survived but became ill or
disabled. Moreover, the deceased include children, who, at their tender age, were forced
to engage in intense labor beyond their capacity, including farming, sewing, mining, and
timber-cutting.
Prison camp authorities make these tasks even more dangerous by failing to
provide even the most basic safety gear, such as hard hats during mining. There is no
protection against harsh weather, often causing severe frostbite that requires amputation.
Casualties and deaths are common from work-place accidents such as cave-ins during
mining and fallen timber during tree cutting.26
The prison camps routinely employ torture as a means of interrogation and
punishment. Prison guards engage in fierce beatings that cause eyes to fall out or leg
bones to be exposed.27 As punishment, prisoners are severely restricted in their bodily
movements, sometimes cutting off circulation to the point of crippling or death.28
There is gross disregard for life in general. Prisoners are executed for trivial
reasons, including eating unauthorized food. Moreover, Kim Jong-Il instituted a perverse
incentive system rewarding guards who killed prisoners during an attempted escape.29 In
one disturbing instance, a prison guard forced a prisoner to pretend to escape and then
shot him in order to claim his reward.30
Finally, forced abortion and infanticide are common practice in the prison camps.31
Women are often trafficked across borders to China for sex trade. When they become
pregnant, these women are sometimes returned to North Korea and forced to go under
abortion to prevent the crossover between North Korean and Chinese races. Babies
carried for more than eight months are birthed and immediately suffocated or abandoned
in front of the mother.32 As illustrated by these examples, the physical and mental wellbeing of countless North Koreans is devastated in the prison camps, on a daily basis.
Lately, North Korea has gone through significant changes, most notably the death
of Kim Jong-Il, and the succession of his son Kim Jong-Un. Since coming into power,
21

Id.
Id.
23 See id.
24 See DLA P IPER, supra note 3, at 35-36.
25 Id. at 37.
26 Id. at 37-38.
27 Id. at 39.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 40.
30 DLA P IPER, supra note 3, at 40.
31 Id.
32 Id.
22
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Kim Jong-Un has made repeated declarations of war and ultimatums of nuclear attack
against South Korea and the U.S.33 Judging by his conduct thus far, Kim Jong-Un seems
to continue his predecessors’ history of nuclear threats and aversion to foreign
diplomacy. At the same time, South Korea and the U.S. continue to support the agenda of
peace in the Korean peninsula. Kwan-li-so continues to exist against this backdrop of fear
and hope, war and diplomacy.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY REACTS
¶29

¶30

¶31

¶32

¶33

The international community has made some effort to voice their concern regarding
the deplorable conditions in North Korean prison camps. The discussions began with SixParty Talks in August 2003 involving North Korea, South Korea, the United States,
China, Russia, and Japan, where the parties discussed various issues from disarmament to
human rights violations in prison camps.34 Also, in 2003 the U.N.’s former Commission
on Human Rights (“Commission”) passed its first resolution pointing out several human
rights violations, including prison camps.35
The same Commission also called on North Korea to allow NGOs access to the
country to ensure that humanitarian assistance was delivered to those in need. They also
requested that the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights engage in a dialogue with
the North Korean government.36
In 2004, the Commission passed a second resolution regarding North Korea
expressing “deep concern at the precarious humanitarian situation in the country.”37 In an
attempt to involve North Korea directly in the dialogue about human rights, the 2004
Resolution requested that a Special Rapporteur be appointed, and urged the North Korean
government to grant him full access to the government and the people of North Korea.
Vitit Muntarbhorn, the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in North Korea,
issued his first report in January 2005. In addition to commending North Korea for taking
positive steps towards cooperating with the U.N., the report broadly suggested that North
Korea abide by international human rights conventions and reform its laws accordingly.
However, on March 2, 2005 the North Korean government stated its “resolute rejection”
of the 2004 Resolution claiming that the U.N. Resolution was politically motivated.38
The Special Rapporteur issued his second report in August 2005, elaborating on the
issues raised in his January 2005 report and requesting that the North Korean government
take “immediate action to prevent abuses and provide redress.”39 The Commission passed
33 Jack Kim, North Korea Threats: Pyongyang Steps up Rhetoric Against U.S. Bases in Japan and Guam,
THE HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/21/north-koreathreats_n_2920984.html; Sam Kim, North Korea Reportedly Entering 'State Of War' Against South Korea,
THE HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/29/north-korea-state-ofwar_n_2982025.html.
34 DLA P IPER, supra note 3, at 68.
35 Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2003/10, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/L.11 (Apr. 16, 2003).
36 Id.
37 Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Res. 2004/13, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/2004/23 – E/CN.4/2004/127
(Apr. 15, 2004), at 61.
38 Letter dated 28 Feb. 2005 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea to the United Nations Office at Geneva Addressed to the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
61st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/G/13 (Mar. 2, 2005).
39 Id. at 74.

218

Vol. 12:2]

Hannah Lee

a third resolution regarding the North Korea situation in April 2005, reiterating its deep
concern about the “continuing reports of systematic, widespread and grave violations of
human rights.”40 The resolution voiced the Commission’s concern that the North Korean
government had refused to cooperate with any U.N. body, including the Commission and
the Special Rapporteur.41
¶34
The Special Rapporteur issued his third report on January 23, 2006, in which he
described his numerous attempts to obtain an invitation to visit North Korea.42 Finally, he
issued his fourth report on September 27, 2006, stating that human rights abuses in North
Korea remained “rampant” and that the North Korean government had been
“uncooperative” with respect to his communications with them.43 As illustrated by the
five reports by the Special Rapporteur, North Korea has generally been unreceptive to
outside communication with regards to its human rights conditions.
¶35
The U.N. General Assembly adopted its own resolution echoing the concerns of the
Commission on Human Rights and the Special Rapporteur, expressing its disappointment
with the North Korean government’s refusal to recognize the mandate of the Special
Rapporteur and about the “reports of systematic, widespread, and grave violations of
human rights.”44
¶36
Notwithstanding these efforts, North Korea has continued to refuse to engage in
dialogue with the United Nations regarding its human rights violations.45
III. NORTH KOREA’S POSITION
¶37

Examining North Korea’s criminal law sheds light on its official policy regarding
detainment. The 1974 Criminal Law was guided by the policy of suppressing “antirevolutionary elements.”46 “Anti-revolutionary offenses” were categorized as the most
pernicious offense to the socialist regime, and were punishable by death. Although the
language has been softened through reform, the basic ideology of protecting the status
quo remains.
¶38
Consistent with its policy of denial, the North Korean Criminal Law fails to even
mention kwan-li-so, suggesting that the institution lacks legal basis in North Korean

G.A. Res. 60/173, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/173 (Dec. 16, 2005).
See id.
42 Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any
Part of the World: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/35 (Jan. 23, 2006).
43 Id. at 75.
44 G.A. Res.. 60/173, supra note 40.
45 In March 2013, a three-member Commission of Inquiry was established by the United Nations Human
Rights Council. The Commission had a one-year mandate to investigate allegations of systematic,
widespread and grave violations of human rights, including possible crimes against humanity, by the North
Korean government. In February 2014, the Commission published their report documenting human rights
abuses, driven by “policies established at the highest level of State,” committed in North Korea. The report
also calls for urgent action to address the rights situation in the country. UN-Mandated Human Rights
Inquiry on DPR Korea Documents 'Widespread, Systematic Abuses, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Apr. 17, 2014),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47160#.UxlqAvldX01.
46 In Sup Han, The 2004 Revision of Criminal Law in North Korea: A Take-off?, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L
L. 122, 127 (2006).
40

41
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law.47 Instead, the Criminal Procedure Law and Criminal Law mention kyo-hwa-so,
which are prisons for standard criminals.48 Since it lacks basis even in domestic
legislation, kwan-li-so should be characterized as truly extra-judicial, lacking any
procedural guidance or guarantees of basic human rights.
¶39
North Korea has gone so far as to deny that there are any human rights violations in
the country. In 1994 it proclaimed through its official publication, The People’s Korea,
that “there is no ‘human rights problem’ in our Republic either from the institutional or
from the legal point of view.”49
¶40
North Korea has maintained its position that the principle of non-interference and
protection of national sovereignty must be observed over humanitarian intervention.
Furthermore, North Korea has rejected the U.N.’s outreach, claiming the U.N. is
motivated by “a plot of propaganda fabricated and persistently pursued by hostile forces”
as part of a campaign of psychological warfare to “overthrow the State system of [North
Korea].”50
IV. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
¶41

Before discussing how to address the gross violation of human rights at North
Korean prison camps, it is critical to examine the legal instruments that are available.
What is the customary international law regarding fundamental civil and political rights
of every human being, including those of North Korean detainees?
¶42
The forcible detention, punishment, and imprisonment of the North Korean
political prisoners violates several key international human rights principles, such as
those contained in the twin instruments of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), which prohibit torture and persecution of vulnerable
groups, as well as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome
Statute”).51 Below is a discussion of the applicable provisions.
¶43
The North Korean prison camp situation violates the following provisions of the
ICCPR: right to life (Article 6); right not be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment (Article 7); right not to be held in slavery or servitude (Article 8);
right not be held in arbitrary detention (Article 9); right for all persons deprived of liberty
to be treated with humanity (Article 10); right to free movement (Article 12); right to
recognition as a person before the law (Article 16); right not to be subjected to arbitrary
interference with privacy, family, home or correspondence (Article 17); right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18); right to hold opinion without
interference (Article 19); right to peaceable assembly (Article 21); right to freedom of
Id. at 128.
Id.
49 DLA P IPER, supra note 3, at 10.
50 Han, supra note 46, at 131.
51 DAVID HAWK, THE HIDDEN GULAG: THE LIVES AND VOICES OF “THOSE WHO ARE SENT TO THE
MOUNTAINS” EXPOSING NORTH KOREA’S VAST SYSTEM OF LAWLESS IMPRISONMENT (2d. ed. 2012),
http://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_HiddenGulag2_Web_5-18.pdf; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 17; International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, art. 11(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
47

48
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association (Article 22); and rights to equal protection and non-discrimination, including
on grounds of political or other opinion, birth, or other status (Article 26).52
The forcible transfer, detainment, torture and cruel treatment of North Korean
citizens for alleged anti-state conduct or expression are clear violations of the above
ICCPR provisions. The lack of due process in the initial arrest, for example, goes against
Articles 9, 12, 16, and 17. The fact that the citizens are charged with and punished for
holding an opinion (“wrong-thinking”) or forming alliances that are frowned upon by the
state, are violations of Articles 18, 19, 21, and 26. Finally, the systematic tortures through
physical punishment and forced starvation, as well as punishments that include execution
for attempted escape, violate the protections guaranteed by Articles 6, 7, and 10.
In addition to treaties like the ICCPR, reference must be made to authoritative
international documents such as the Standard Minimum Rules and the Basic Principles
for the Treatment of Prisoners, which are promulgated by the United Nations.53 It is also
helpful to look at various interpretations by the Human Rights Committee.
For instance, in Larossa v. Uruguay,54 the Committee found that the prison
conditions in which the plaintiff was placed, with cement beds, no windows, and artificial
light around the clock, violated Articles 7 and 10(1) of the ICCPR. In this case, even
solitary confinement for a period of a month was found to be a violation of international
standards. By this logic, the prison conditions in North Korea, which involve more
extreme forms of human rights violations such as torture, physical violence, forced labor,
and indefinite prison terms, are in violation of Articles 7 and 10(1) of the ICCPR.
The Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court, was adopted
on July 17, 1998, and entered into force on July 1, 2002. Today the Rome Statute is
recognized as customary international law, with 139 signatories and 118 ratifications.55
However, unfortunately, North Korea is conspicuously absent in the list of signatories.
This fact complicates the issue of ICC jurisdiction over North Korean conduct.
Nonetheless, argument can be made that the Rome Statute still applies to North
Korea because, as mentioned above, the ICC creates customary international law, which
is recognized as a primary source of international law by the International Court of
Justice, the United Nations, and member states. Furthermore, although North Korea is not
a party to the Rome Statute, the ICC may have jurisdiction over crimes committed by
DPRK citizens, through any one of three ways: (1) the U.N. Security Council refers a
case to it, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter; (2) a State Party refers the
situation to the ICC; or (3) the prosecutor initiates an investigation proprio motu,
pursuant to Article 13 of the Rome Statute.56
Further, what makes the Rome Statute pertinent to the issue of prison camps in
North Korea is the fact that the it identifies “crimes against humanity” as a new
development in defining gross violations of the standards set forth by established legal
frameworks, such as the ICCPR. The language defining this new category of “crimes
HAWK, supra note 51, at 160.
Jeff Vize, Torture, Forced Confessions, and Inhuman Punishments: Human Rights Abuses in the
Japanese Penal System, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 329, 348 (2003).
54 Comm. on Hum. Rts., Gustavo Raul Larrosa Bequio v. Uruguay, Communication, No. 88/1981, U.N.
Doc. A/38/40, at 180 (1983).
55 World Signatories and Ratifications, COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT.,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romesignatures.
56 Id. at 63-64.
52

53
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against humanity” under the Rome Statute removes any doubt that the Rome Statute
applies to the North Korean kwan-li-so. Indeed, the definition of “crimes against
humanity” under the Rome Statute is reasonably flexible to extend to even non-signatory
nations like North Korea, which makes it a powerful instrument to enforce international
criminal standards.
¶50
The Rome Statute allows a more complex understanding of the degrees of violation
by filling the gap that existed between what are called “serious violations of the standards
of the ICCPR” and “genocide” as defined in international law. For instance, arbitrary
detainment and torture are more atrocious than “violations,” but fall short of “genocide.”
The Rome Statute also provides a new and more workable definition of “crimes against
humanity” 57 than previous definitions, with specific and comprehensive sub-categories.
Owing to these new developments, the arbitrary incarceration in North Korea falls
squarely into the new definition of "crimes against humanity" under the Rome Statute.
¶51
First, kwan-li-so is part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the
civilian population of North Korea, and the known consequences include murder,
enslavement or forced labor, imprisonment, forcible transfer of population, torture, and
sexual violence. Also applicable are the categories of persecution due to political
orientation, enforced disappearance of persons, and causing of great suffering or serious
injury to physical and mental health. The fact that the majority of the defined
circumstances that constitute crimes against humanity are met by the operation of kwanli-so is alarming.
¶52
An additional factor that is relevant under the Rome Statute analysis is the potential
criminal liability of the North Korean government itself. For instance, there is an
argument that under Article 53 of the Rome Statute, there is “a reasonable basis to
believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the [International Criminal Court] has been
or is being committed.”58 According to the facts established above, there is a reasonable
For the purpose of this Statute, “crime against humanity” means any of the following acts when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack:
a. Murder;
b. Extermination;
c. Enslavement;
d. Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
e. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
f. Torture;
g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of
sexual violence of comparable gravity;
h. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural,
religious, gender, . . . or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international
law in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court;
i. Enforced disappearance of person;
j. The crime of apartheid;
k. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to body
or to mental or physical health.
Rome Statute, art. 7.
58 Grace M. Kang, Esq., A Case for the Prosecution of Kim Jong Il for Crimes Against Humanity,
Genocide, and War Crimes, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 51, 78 (2006).
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basis upon which to hold the North Korean regime criminally liable for crimes against
humanity, genocide, and war crimes.
¶53
The North Korean government has a policy of committing crimes against
humanity, as defined by the Rome Statute. Moreover, due to the highly centralized and
controlled governing structure of the Kim regime, the top political officials in North
Korea are highly likely to have knowledge of the severe abuse of the prisoners, which
satisfies criminal intent under customary international law. Furthermore, there is neither
accountability nor rule of law in North Korea, since its domestic laws fail to correct the
criminal conduct of its government in carrying out the detainment policy. This satisfies
the Article 17 requirement that domestic remedies be unavailable or inadequate before
the International Criminal Court takes the case under its jurisdiction.
V. A CASE FOR INTERVENTION
¶54

One scholar speculates that, notwithstanding North Korea’s attitude of noncooperation, the “diplomatic ping-pong”59 between the U.N. and North Korea holds
promise of yielding some progress in the future. For example, North Korea revised its
Criminal Law in 2004, which is a step forward in the direction of North Korea’s eventual
adoption of the rule of law. North Korea’s revised Criminal Law articulates the principle
of legality, with specific articles that go beyond vague analogies and retroactive
language. For instance, Article 6 says, “[o]nly offenses which are clarified under the
provisions of Criminal Law shall be criminally accountable by the state.”60 In the revised
Criminal Law of North Korea, the ideological tone is softened, and there is heightened
focus on the control of economic and social, rather than political, offenses.61
¶55
In addition, North Korea has shown some respect for international human rights
standards, albeit nominally. The Special Rapporteur noted several other positive actions
that North Korea has taken, including becoming a signatory to four key human rights
treaties, occasionally allowing U.N. agencies and NGOs to enter the country, warming
relations between North Korea and other countries, and having some legal and operations
infrastructure that can help promote and protect human rights.62 As a party to the treaties,
the North Korean government has submitted country reports to the U.N. monitoring
committees such as the former Human Rights Commission.63
¶56
Moreover, as insulated and secretive as North Korea is, it is still susceptible to
pressures from the outside. For example, North Korea has been denying the existence of
prison camps for years. However, when faced with commercial satellite photos of the
prisons and testimonials from ex-prisoners, North Korea reportedly closed or otherwise
downsized or moved some camps into other remote areas.64 Yet another example of the
DPRK’s awareness of outside pressures is its revision of its Criminal Law.
¶57
Nonetheless, the fact remains that North Korea is ruled under a dictatorship and is
hostile toward other nations. While it is a signatory to key international conventions, it
Han, supra note 46, at 132.
Id. at 124; The 1950 Criminal Law, art. 6 (1950) (N. Korea).
61 Han, supra note 46, at 124.
62 DLA P IPER, supra note 3, at 72.
63 Han, supra note 46, at 130-131.
64 Id. at 132.
59
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has not complied with their terms. There is a need for a politically viable alternative to
coercion, such as unilateral sanctions, in order to bring North Korea in line with
international human rights standards. At the same time, given the non-cooperation by the
North Korean government, the solution should not require exhaustion of domestic
remedies, and instead have far-reaching jurisdiction and enforceability.
¶58
Presumably, no one can predict North Korea’s reaction to intervention, whether it
be forceful or diplomatic. Therefore, the international community must take a processoriented approach, whereby success is measured in terms of moving forward in the right
direction, rather than in terms of the unlikely prospect of DPRK’s swift abolishment of
kwan-li-so. In this regard, the most practical measure is to apply public pressure and
make known to North Korea that there will be political consequences if there is inaction
on their part to increase compliance with the ICCPR and the Rome Statute. In the longterm, international oversight and intervention will pressure North Korea to further revise
its criminal law and increase compliance with the above-mentioned standards.
¶59
Specifically, the first and necessary step is spreading information to countries other
than North Korea about the very existence of kwan-li-so and its deplorable conditions, as
well as providing updates on any developments. This is a collaborative process which
requires utilizing news networks, the Internet, and other media sources. Moreover, to
increase effectiveness of an aggressive media campaign, there needs to be a centralized
monitoring mechanism, one that is reputable and financially equipped.
VI. CONVENTIONAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN THROUGH U.N. BODIES
¶60

In today’s world, it is difficult to envision a global media campaign that does not
use the Internet as its main platform. Why involve a U.N. agency when the dialogue can
develop organically through user-generated content? The role of the Internet has
expanded with the technological change over the past ten years. For example, social
media has a growing presence in progressive political change.65 The term “Twitter
revolution” refers to user-generated, spontaneous interaction on the social networking site
Twitter.com to organize web-based, coordinated activism. As an example, the American
Red Cross used Twitter to raise over $8 million U.S. dollars for Haitian relief.66 Today,
more than ever, any media campaign must use the web in order to be relevant.
¶61
In the case of North Korea, however, web-based media and user-generated social
media are not the best option. To begin with, North Korea severely limits Internet access
to the most elite members of society.67 Furthermore, as Malcom Gladwell has argued,
social media is ill-suited for long-term social or political change for a number of
reasons.68 Social networking sites are known to create weak ties and low-risk activism
that is often short-lived. In other words, while user-generated content may inspire rapid
Sarah Joseph, Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 145
(2012).
66 Mary Kate Cary, 5 Ways New Media Are changing Politics, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Feb. 4,
2010), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/02/04/5-ways-new-media-are-changing-politics.
67 Martyn Williams, North Korea Moves Quietly Onto the Internet, COMPUTER WORLD (June 10, 2010),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9177968/North_Korea_moves_quietly_onto_the_Internet?taxono
myId=18&pageNumber=2.
68 Malcolm Gladwell, Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 4,
2010), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell.
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exchange of information, it is not a forum for lasting, meaningful dialogue that will bring
about change in North Korea.
¶62
Having a U.N. agency coordinate a centralized and deliberate campaign, on the
other hand, lends legitimacy, credibility, and longevity to the cause of raising awareness
about kwan-li-so. While information may not be as easily retransmitted as user-generated
content via the Internet, the U.N., as a prominent international peace-keeping entity, will
nonetheless attract a large audience. Moreover, the U.N. is equipped to provide access to
information as well as serve as an established platform for conversation and debate.
¶63
Given the new leader Kim Jong-Un’s recent nuclear threats and the mounting
tension in the Korean peninsula, it is vital that any media coverage of North Korea be
tactful. In carrying out a media campaign, there must be use of politically sensitive
language that describes the situation accurately but also neutrally. Involving the U.N.
organs mentioned above will allow centralized control over the quality and content of
information exchange.
VII. WORKING GROUP ON ARBITRARY DETENTION AND THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
¶64

While North Korea has refused to answer to its main organs, including the U.N.
General Assembly, former Commission on Human Rights, and Special Rapporteur on
Human Rights in North Korea, the U.N. remains the most prominent international body
to police violations of human rights. The goal of protecting human rights is explicitly
stated in the U.N. Charter: “[t]he U.N. shall promote universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.”69 This principle was
reinforced in the Millennium Declaration, and specified in the High-Level Panel report in
2004: “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.” The report expanded on the
responsibility to protect doctrine, affirming the “obligation of a state to protect welfare of
its own people.”70
¶65
One possible solution to the North Korean prisons camps is to involve the United
Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (“WGAD”). WGAD is a body within the
U.N. Human Rights Council that issues opinions regarding the detention of individuals in
various countries. The WGAD works by utilizing global institutions and “soft law,” its
methods being quasi-judicial and its opinions non-binding.71
¶66
Because of its informal nature, the WGAD largely depends on civil society to carry
out its recommendations. In doing so, it establishes and maintains regulatory networks or
“global administration,” affecting international rule of law and standards of conduct.
While it lacks enforcement power, WGAD can act as a catalyst for countries to adhere to
international human rights treaties and conventions.72 It can facilitate information sharing
among civil society and nations, encouraging a momentum for change in North Korea.
The WGAD also has the procedural advantage of not requiring the exhaustion of
U.N. Charter art. 55 (c).
Secretary-General, Report of the Security-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004),
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf.
71 Jared M. Genser & Margaret K. Winterkorn-Meikle, The Intersection of Politics and International Law:
The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in Theory and in Practice, 39 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 687, 690 (2008).
72 Id. at 688, 690.
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domestic remedies to file a case.73 This allows WGAD to circumvent North Korean
government’s resistance or stalling tactics.
Some speculate that the WGAD, like most U.N. entities, is politically motivated in
its case selection. For example, WGAD investigated the situation of detainees held by the
U.S. government in Guantánamo Bay, while ignoring other similar detention facilities
like the North Korean kwan-li-so.74 Commissioning the WGAD to resolve the issue of
arbitrary detainment in North Korea would allow it to overcome its appearance of
political bias.
Scholars Jared Genser and Margaret Winterkorn-Meikle conclude from four case
studies that the success of WGAD’s involvement is affected by various factors including
the country in question and the individuals who are detained.75 For instance, the more
compelling the personal profile of the detained and the facts surrounding the arrest, such
as the involvement of torture and foreign citizenship, the more likely it is that the case
will attract international attention. The sensitivity of the detaining country to international
pressures may also affect the outcome. The case studies suggest, however, that even
intransigent countries like China and North Korea can be susceptible to pressure.76
Applying this to the situation in North Korea, the prospect of U.N. intervention is
greater when it involves foreign nationals. A case that was first filed to the Working
Group in 1995 involved a South Korean, Shin Sook Ja, who was detained against her will
in North Korea since 1985.77 Recently in March 2012, WGAD called on North Korea to
inquire about the fate of Shin. Shin was reportedly interned in the notorious Yodok
concentration camp with her two daughters, Oh Hae Won and Oh Kyu Won. The North
Korean government responded in April, saying that Shin died of hepatitis, but refused to
provide detailed information about the current situation of the two daughters or rationale
for their detention. In Opinions adopted on May 2, 2012, the WGAD declared the yearslong detention as arbitrary and in violation of international law.78
The WGAD also acknowledged that it was “aware of the disturbing reports from
non-governmental organizations and other sources in the public domain alleging
widespread arbitrary detention and links to forced labour” in North Korea, and noted that
under certain circumstances, “widespread or systematic imprisonment or other severe
deprivation of liberty in violation of the fundamental rules of international law may
constitute crimes against humanity.”79 Involving the WGAD is advantageous because of
its history of interest in the North Korean prison camps issue.
Involving the WGAD is further advantageous because of its pre-existing ties to
international civil society and news groups. WGAD’s participation in addressing the
North Korean prison camp issue will help frame it as humanitarian crisis and increase
further dialogue and information-sharing. Going through the WGAD will open ways to
involve the North Korean government in the dialogue as well. Because humanitarian
crimes is a serious allegation and a politically sensitive issue, there needs to be a
Id. at 696.
Id.at 713.
75 Id. at 736-39.
76 See id. at 736.
77 Hum. Rts. Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, April 30, 2012-May 4, 2012, U.N. WGAD,
63d Sess., Supp. No. 4, Doc.A/HRC/WGAD/2012/4 (2012).
78 Id.
79 Id.
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politically neutral organization to objectively, accurately, and credibly research the
situation and make a balanced recommendation.
A second approach is to involve the U.N. Security Council under the international
legal doctrine of a nation’s responsibility to protect its people. A 2006 report
commissioned by former President of the Czech Republic Vaclav Havel, former Prime
Minister of Norway Kjell Magne Bondevik, and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Elie Wiesel,
makes this proposal.80 The report, authored jointly by the international law firm DLA
Piper and the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, calls for Security
Council’s intervention in the situation in North Korea, where the government failed in its
responsibility to protect its own citizens in two major areas, food policy and treatment of
political prisoners.81
The U.N. Security Council is charged with maintaining peace, and is legally
mandated to make binding decisions regarding human rights. Therefore, the report
alleges, the Security Council assumes the duty to protect the North Korean population,
since its own government has failed to do so by inflicting serious suffering, harm, and
repression upon its people. This principle rests on the concept that sovereignty involves
both rights and responsibilities, and that failure to uphold sovereign responsibilities may
warrant humanitarian intervention.82
On September 20, 2005, during the World Summit, the leaders in the U.N. General
Assembly adopted a statement in which they said: “. . . [W]e are prepared to take
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council . . . [if]
national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from . . . crimes
against humanity.”83 Subsequently, this statement was unanimously endorsed in
Resolution 1674 by the Security Council.84 These principles comport with the ideals of
the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his Millennium Report to the General
Assembly, whereby each member state has a responsibility to protect both their own
citizens and those of other states.85
Given these mandates, the U.N. Security Council is an appropriate entity to
publicize the issue of kwan-li-so in North Korea. The Security Coucil has the authority to
engage in dialogue with North Korea regarding its detainment policy. For instance, it
may adopt a non-punitive resolution that outlines North Korea’s failure to protect their
people, and request that North Korea embrace the U.N.’s humanitarian assistance and
release political prisoners who are wrongfully detained.86 Moreover, in case North Korea
fails to comply with the non-punitive resolution, the Security Council can always resort
to adopting a binding resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. In addition to
having these powers, the Security Council also has the advantage of having established
relations with the global community and media channels.

DLA PIPER, supra note 3.
See id.
82 See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
83 Id. at ii.
84 See S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. SCOR, Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 20, 2006).
85 Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century, ¶ 43,
UN Doc. No. A/54/2000 (Apr. 3, 2000).
86 Id. at v.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
¶76

The very existence of state-instituted mass concentration camps in North Korea is
offensive to the principles of international human rights. What is more alarming is that
the human rights violations are not isolated incidents, but rather form a systematic
pattern, exposing all North Korean citizens to the risk of inhumane treatment at the whim
of the government.
¶77
The North Korean prisoners, arrested without warrants, are unduly deprived of
physical liberty in violation of due process protections of humanitarian treaties such as
the ICCPR. The shock multiplies when considering the fact that the prisoners, including
children, are often worked to death in unsafe conditions and are intentionally kept
undernourished and tortured as a means of control.
¶78
In order to address this issue, the world must acknowledge that the operation of the
political prison camps in North Korea constitutes “crimes against humanity” as defined in
Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Furthermore, foreign states can exert pressure on North
Korea to comply with the international rule of law through coordinated media campaigns
designed by U.N. bodies such as the WGAD or the Security Council. Historically, news
media has served an important role in giving a voice to the voiceless. By connecting
individuals, NGOs, and states to build an informal network of information-sharing and
dialogue on the issue, the global community will be better equipped to apply political
pressure on North Korea’s detainment policy, which remains the most egregious form of
human rights violation that exists today.
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